

Structural Group Unfairness

Measurement and Mitigation by means of the Effective Resistance

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<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.03223.pdf>

What is Social Capital?

Information is a resource

- Each person is a source of important information



Social Capital

- Networks, **relationships**, and norms of trust and reciprocity within a community or society **that facilitate cooperation and collective action**
- Power derived from your **social connections**

Structural Social Capital

- Social capital derived from the **position** of a person in a network [Burt]
- Position determines the **control, access and power to spread information**

Source: [Google](#)

The **Information Flow** in the network determines the social capital of individuals
Disparities on the position in the network → Disparities in the individual Social Capital
[Bashardoust 2023]

Group Unfairness in Social Capital

Different Position in the Network → Disparities in Social Capital

[Arnaiz-Rodriguez et al, 2024]

Groups are distributed in the network in different ways

→ different flow of information on different groups

→ different social capital (Unfairness in Social Capital)

Structural Group Unfairness
SGU



Accurate Measurement of
Information Flow



Effective Mitigation of
Structural Group Unfairness

Measure Group Social Capital via Information Flow

Information flow in the network determines the node's information access and control

- Pairwise distances between nodes

Previous work use metrics that

- Fail to capture the global properties of the topology → Shortest-path
- Lack of theoretical interpretation and guarantees → IC

We propose to use **Effective Resistance (R_{uv})** as the pairwise distance metric


- Pairwise information distance based on Spectral Graph Theory
- Captures global behavior and long-range dependencies
- $R_{uv} \propto$ the expected time to reach v from u and come back to u
 - Average of all existing paths between u and v !

$$R_{uv} = (\mathbf{e}_u - \mathbf{e}_v) \mathbf{L}^\dagger (\mathbf{e}_u - \mathbf{e}_v)^\top$$

$$R_{uv} = \sum_{i>0} \frac{1}{\lambda_i} (\phi_i(u) - \phi_i(v))^2$$

$$R_{uv} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{d_u} (\mathbf{A}^i)_{uu} + \frac{1}{d_v} (\mathbf{A}^i)_{vv} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{d_u d_v}} 2(\mathbf{A}^i)_{uv} \right)$$

The more and shorter paths between a pair of nodes The smaller R_{uv} is



We define the (inverse) social capital of a single node as the total sum of all it's distances to everyone else

$$R_{tot}(u) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} R_{uv}$$

Measures of Group Social Capital


Group Isolation

The *lower* the better

$$R_{\text{tot}}(S_i) = \mathbb{E}_{u \sim S_i} [R_{\text{tot}}(u)]$$

Expected R_{uv} when sampling one node from group S_i and another node at random

Intuition: average distance to everyone for the nodes of the group



$$\begin{aligned} R_{\text{tot}}(\mathcal{S}) &= 12.3 - \text{BETTER} \\ R_{\text{tot}}(\mathcal{S}) &= 16.6 \\ R_{\text{tot}}(\mathcal{S}) &= 25.9 - \text{WORST} \end{aligned}$$


Group Diameter

The *lower* the better

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(S_i) = \mathbb{E}_{u \sim S_i} \left[\max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} R_{uv} \right]$$

Expected **worst-case** R_{uv} when sampling one node from group S_i and another node at random

Intuition: average maximum distance for the nodes of the group



$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(\mathcal{S}) &= 0.97 - \text{WORST} \\ \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(\mathcal{S}) &= 0.87 \\ \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(\mathcal{S}) &= 0.85 - \text{BETTER} \end{aligned}$$

Group Control


The *higher* the better

$$B_R(S_i) = \mathbb{E}_{u \sim S_i} [B_R(u)]$$

$$B_R(u) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{N}(u)} R_{uv}$$

Expected **Information bottleneck** (similar to node's Ricci curvature)

Intuition: average information control for the nodes of the group



$$\begin{aligned} B_R(\mathcal{S}) &= 1.96 \\ B_R(\mathcal{S}) &= 2.00 - \text{BETTER} \\ B_R(\mathcal{S}) &= 1.77 - \text{WORST} \end{aligned}$$

Measures of Structural Group Unfairness (SGU)

Based on Rawlsian concept of Fairness, SGU measures the social capital gap for the most disadvantaged group

Isolation Disparity

$$R_{\text{tot}}(S_i) = R_{\text{tot}}(S_j), \forall i, j \in SA.$$

$$\Delta R_{\text{tot}} = \max_{i,j \in SA} (R_{\text{tot}}(S_i) - R_{\text{tot}}(S_j)).$$

Diameter Disparity

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(S_i) = \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(S_j), \forall i, j \in SA.$$

$$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}} = \max_{i,j \in SA} (\mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(S_i) - \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}(S_j)).$$

Control Disparity


$$B_R(S_i) = B_R(S_j) = 2 - \frac{2}{|\mathcal{V}|}, \forall i, j \in SA.$$

$$\Delta B_R = \max_{i,j \in SA} (B_R(S_i) - B_R(S_j)).$$

G	$R_{\text{tot}} \downarrow$		$\mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}} \downarrow$		$B_R \uparrow$	
Facebook (female)	221.4	ΔR_{tot}	2.29	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}$	1.93	ΔB_R
Facebook (male)	179.8	41.62	2.25	0.042	2.03	0.107
UNC28 (female)	608.6	ΔR_{tot}	2.11	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}$	1.99	ΔB_R
UNC28 (male)	586.3	22.4	2.11	0.006	2.00	0.009
Google+ (female)	564.1	ΔR_{tot}	1.31	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{\text{diam}}$	1.81	ΔB_R
Google+ (male)	287.7	276.4	1.24	0.078	2.32	0.51


Group social capital and SGU in real-world online social networks. Group with the largest social capital is highlighted in bold.

How to mitigate SGU?



Common RecSys → similarity → segregation, polarization

RecSys maximize engagement → Same SGU



Create **weak connections** improves the information flow

Reduces polarization, discrimination and **isolation**

Improves diversity and connects minorities

Unifies the information control

Granovetter. The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. *Sociological theory* (1983)




Burt. 2004. Structural holes and good ideas. *American journal of sociology* (2004)

Arnaiz-Rodriguez, et al. Structural Group Unfairness: Measurement and Mitigation by means of the Effective Resistance. (2024)

ERG: Edge Augmentation to mitigate SGU

- Use **Effective Resistance informed edge addition** reduce the disparities in social capital between groups and individuals **while also improve the social capital for all groups**
- Problem defined as a budgeted **densifier** problem

$$G' = \min_{G'=(\mathcal{V},\mathcal{E}')} \mathbb{E}_{u,v \sim \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{V}} [R_{uv}] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad |\mathcal{E}' \setminus \mathcal{E}| = B \quad \mathcal{E} \subset \mathcal{E}'$$



Algorithm 1: ERG-Link

Data: Graph $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, a protected attribute SA, budget B of total number of edges to add
 Result: New Graph $G' = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}')$ with B new edges

- 1 $L = D - A;$
- 2 $S_d = \text{argmax}_{S_i, \forall i \in SA} R_{\text{tot}}(S_i);$ // Identify the most disadvantaged group
 – Maximum ER edges allow to connect minorities –
- 3 Repeat
- 4 $L^\dagger = \sum_{i>0} \frac{1}{\lambda_i} \phi_i \phi_i^\top = (L + \frac{11^\top}{\lambda_1})^{-1} - \frac{11^\top}{\lambda_1};$
- 5 $R = \frac{1}{2} \text{diag}(L^\dagger)^\top + \text{diag}(L^\dagger);$ // Compute effective resistance
- 6 $C = \{(u,v) \mid u \in S_d, v \in S_d, (u,v) \notin \mathcal{E}\};$ // Select edge candidates
- 7 $\mathcal{E}' = \mathcal{E} \cup \text{argmax}_{(u,v) \in C} R_{uv};$ // Add edge with maximum effective resistance
- 8 $L = L + (e_u - e_v)(e_u - e_v)^\top;$ // Update L
- 9 until $|\mathcal{E}' \setminus \mathcal{E}| = B;$
- 10 return $G';$

Add the edge between nodes with maximum R_{uv} on which (at least) one endpoint on the discriminated group

As ER is heavily theoretically grounded, this simple approach is effective and provides strong insights:

- Theoretically a greedy optimal densifier wrt Information Flow –
- E.g.: Adding $\max R_{uv}$ improve the robustness and over-squashing (proxies of Information Flow) –

Experiments on Real World: Group SC and SGU

Results on 3 real-world online social networks: Facebook, UNC and Google+

(a) Facebook ($B=50$)

(b) UNC28 ($B=5000$)





(c) Google+ ($B=5000$)

	ΔR_{tot}	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{diam}$	ΔB_R
G (original)	41.62	0.042	0.107
Random	38.7	0.039	0.108
DW	36.3	0.031	0.104
Cos	28.7	0.029	0.120
ERG	10.3	0.009	0.098

	ΔR_{tot}	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{diam}$	ΔB_R
G (original)	22.4	0.006	0.009
Random	19.8	0.005	0.014
DW	22.2	0.006	0.004
Cos	19.1	0.005	0.102
ERG	8.8	0.002	0.003

	ΔR_{tot}	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{diam}$	ΔB_R
G (original)	276.4	0.078	0.51
Random	129.4	0.037	0.47
DW	274.1	0.078	0.51
Cos	86.8	0.025	0.47
ERG	37.1	0.011	0.29

- ERG significantly reduces SGU
- ERG is effective even adding few links
- **Reduces SGU while improving the social capital of all groups**



Take-home ideas

Social Networks are very useful to analyze social dynamics or make predictions about people and their relationships

Specific [Arnaiz-Rodriguez, Curto and Oliver 2024]:

Your position on a **social network** defines the access, spread-power and control of information you have

↓
Social Capital

It is not trivial to **quantify SC** and to **align the literature** in sociology and graph theory/fairness

↓
Quantitative sociology-aligned measures of social capital based on graph theory

Effective resistance: isolation, diameter and control

There are Social Capital inequalities not trivial to fix

↓
Fix it using an edge augmentation strategy based on the **weakest links**

ERG: Adding the edge that maximizes the information flow on the whole network



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Extra: More Baselines

(a) Facebook ($B=50$)










G (original)	ΔR_{tot}	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{diam}$	ΔB_R
Random	38.7	0.039	0.108
SDRF	41.6	0.042	0.106
FOSR	34.5	0.027	0.109
DW	36.3	0.031	0.104
Cos	28.7	0.029	0.120
ERG	10.3	0.009	0.098
S-DW	43.6	0.041	0.103
S-Cos	41.4	0.042	0.105
S-ERG	41.6	0.042	0.107

(b) UNC28 ($B=5000$)


G (original)	ΔR_{tot}	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{diam}$	ΔB_R
Random	19.8	0.005	0.014
SDRF	22.2	0.006	0.007
FOSR	19.7	0.005	0.017
DW	22.2	0.006	0.004
Cos	19.1	0.005	0.102
ERG	8.8	0.002	0.003
S-DW	20.6	0.006	0.008
S-Cos	22.1	0.006	0.019
S-ERG	22.3	0.006	0.004

(c) Google+ ($B=5000$)


G (original)	ΔR_{tot}	$\Delta \mathcal{R}_{diam}$	ΔB_R
Random	129.4	0.037	0.47
SDRF	276.1	0.079	0.52
FOSR	240.7	0.068	0.50
DW	274.1	0.078	0.51
Cos	86.8	0.025	0.47
ERG	37.1	0.011	0.29
S-DW	272.5	0.078	0.49
S-Cos	236.0	0.067	0.47
S-ERG	276.4	0.079	0.52




(a) Facebook ($B = 50$)




(b) UNC28 ($B = 5000$)






(c) Google+ ($B = 5000$)









Extra: More Results – Metrics Distribution



Extra: More Results – Control Evolution



Extra: More Results – Large Budget



Effect on the Network Structure

